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Abstract 
 
This article presents FVA and CVA of a bilateral derivative in a coherent manner, 
based on recent developments in fair value accounting and ISDA standards. We argue 
that a derivative liability, after primary risk factors being hedged, resembles in economics 
an issued variable funding note, and should be priced at the market rate of the issuer’s 
debt. For the purpose of determining the fair value, the party on the liability side is 
economically neutral to make a deposit to the other party, which earns his current debt 
rate and effectively provides funding and hedging for the party holding the derivative 
asset. The newly derived partial differential equation for an option discounts the 
derivative’s receivable part with counterparty’s curve and payable part with own 
financing curve. The price difference from the counterparty risk free price, or total 
counterparty risk adjustment, is precisely defined by discounting the product of the risk 
free price and the credit spread at the local liability curve. Subsequently the adjustment 
can be broken into a default risk component – CVA and a funding component – FVA, 
consistent with a simple note’s fair value treatment and in accordance with the usual 
understanding of a bond’s credit spread consisting of a CDS spread and a basis. As for 
FVA, we define a cost - credit funding adjustment (CFA) and a benefit - debit funding 
adjustment (DFA), in parallel to CVA and DVA and attributed to counterparty’s and own 
funding basis. This resolves a number of outstanding FVA debate issues, such as double 
counting, violation of the law of one price, misuse of cash flow discounting, and 
controversial hedging of own default risk. It also allows an integrated implementation 
strategy and reuse of existing CVA infrastructure.  
 
Keywords: Counterparty risk, CVA, FVA, DVA, Funding Cost, Derivative Financing, 
coherent CVA and FVA, liability-side pricing, risk-neutral pricing formula. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Some banks are moving ahead with FVA while it’s far from being considered a 
settled issue among academia researchers, accountants, quants, traders, and regulatory 
stakeholders. Indeed, complexity surrounding FVA has only increased as the discussion 
has been deepening.  KPMG (2013) for example highlights nine propositions toward 
understanding and implementation of FVA. While accounting definition of fair value, 
                                                 
1 The views and opinions expressed herein are the views and opinions of the author, and do not  reflect 
those of his employer and any of its affiliates. The author wishes to thank Yi Tang,  Yadong  Li for their 
helpful comments. 
2 Prior to this update, a later research into uncollateralized swaps and implementation by Monte Carlo 
simulation is available in ssrn: Liability-side pricing of non-CCP swap and coherent CVA and FVA 
computation by regression/simulation, August 8, 2015, abstract_id=2498770. 
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ISDA documentation of legal terms of derivative settlement and collateralization, 
investment theory and practice, and banks’ treasury and derivative desk operation 
dominate recent discussion, a difficulty at the center is a lack of consensus on what 
economic principles shall apply when incorporating funding costs into bilateral derivative 
pricing. 
Two streams of research and development can be seen in the existing literature on 
this subject: one is characterized by an ad-hoc valuation adjustment to the risk-free price 
made to take into account of costs of funding the derivatives in addition to CVA/DVA, 
and the other by carefully constructing a Black-Scholes-Merton micro-economy where 
funding of the derivatives and hedging of counterparty credit exposure are integrated with 
delta hedging to replicate the option and to obtain a PDE (Burgard and Kjaer 2011, 2013) 
that governs the eventual fair price and its resultant valuation adjustments.  With the first 
stream, there is little discussion on whether the risk-free price when added with all 
adjustments is arbitrage-free. With regard to the second stream, the resulted PDE directly 
responds to hedge and funding assumptions, no all of which are economically reasonable. 
Hull and White (2012), for example, point out that the extra collateral spread (Piterbarg 
2010) earned by the hedge party runs the risk of ignoring the collaterals’ own credit risk. 
A PDE framework does not automatically result in compatibility with the notion of a risk 
neutral measure, easily testified by the widely observed violation of the law of one price.   
This paper adds a new model to the second stream by proposing the liability side 
pricing principle for uncollateralized derivatives. The key idea is that the fair instrument, 
for the parties of a bilateral derivative trade to hedge their counterparty exposure and to 
fund the derivative, is to have the party on the liability side deposit cash. The party 
making deposit is economically neutral as the deposit will earn a coupon rate same as the 
market rate of the depositor’s debt. The deposit made out of the derivative’s netting set 
would offset the derivative exposure via ISDA’s Set-off provision, avoiding the need of 
otherwise controversial counterparty hedge by means of dealing own CDS or bonds. This 
setup departs from existing literature and allows a new Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) 
equation to be derived and the risk-neutral pricing formula to be revised with the risk-free 
discount rate being replaced by the liability-side’s debt interest rate. The newly defined 
fair value adjustments -- CVA and FVA -- are coherent in that they are holistic results of 
decomposing the total valuation adjustment into default risk and funding risk, they do not 
create arbitrage opportunity, they observe the law of one price, and they can be 
implemented together. 
 
2. Pricing uncollateralized options under bilateral credit and funding risks 
 
Party B (a hypothetic bank) and party C (a customer) enter into an option trade 
with the bank dynamically hedging the option with underlying stock which is financed in 
the repo or security lending market. Both parties have access to a liquid corporate bond 
market, primary or secondary, exogenous to the simple option economy.  
 
2.1 Economics of a bilateral trade 
 
Let’s start by conducting an economic experiment. When party C has a positive 
exposure to party B (the derivative is a receivable to C), C asks B to deposit an amount of 
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cash by promising to pay interest at the market rate of B’s same ranked debt. Party B is 
economically indifferent as he could raise the cash from the bond market at the same rate. 
From B’s balance sheet (B/S) perspective, the new liability assumed by issuing in the 
market place offsets his deposit (on the asset side) so that there is no net balance sheet 
impact3. From cash flow perspective, B receives the market rate from C and pays out the 
same to bond investors. No new cash flow is generated.  
From party C’s perspective, her derivative asset is now financed by B. No other 
forms of financing, including from her own treasury, is necessary. 
If B is holding a receivable, then C would make a deposit earning her market rate. 
To summarize we have obtained the following economic proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 (Market funding of uncollateralized derivative): Parties in an 
uncollateralized bilateral derivative trade implicitly grant each other a funding 
obligation at their respective cash market rates. 
 
Now imagine if B defaults, C has two transactions with B: the derivative 
receivable, and the deposit as a payable. Under common law, the right to set-off would 
apply to determine the final balance of party C’s settlement amount. If the deposit 
amount is same as the derivative close-out amount, the derivative contract and the deposit 
set off completely. The net balance is zero and there is no default settlement cash flow.  
Economically, party C sees it as a market neutral hedging strategy against B’s 
default risk.  
Reciprocally, the defaulting party, party B, has no default settlement cash flow 
either, no default windfall or shortfall. Consequently, there is nothing to hedge upon its 
own default. C’s proposal of a deposit from B at his market rate therefore serves as a 
market neutral hedging strategy for B as well as for C. 
 
Proposition 2 (Market neutral counterparty exposure hedge): Parties in an 
uncollateralized bilateral derivative trade can hedge credit exposure mutually by 
making cash deposit in the same amount as the derivative’s close-out amount. 
 
 This proposition looks same as a fully collateralized derivative under bilateral 
CSA (Credit Support Annex) where the derivative’s mark-to-market is fully 
collateralized. A critical difference exists that the collateralization under CSA is 
contractual, i.e., an integral part of the trade, while here it is non-contractual although 
economically justified and implied. This leads to different rates being applied to cash 
collateral: cash rate (e.g., federal fund rate) with CSA, cash debt rate without CSA. 
Moreover, the deposit is made out of the derivative netting set and is covered by the Set-
off provision of ISDA 2002 Master Agreement or under common laws.  
 Combining these two propositions, the cash deposit serves both purposes of 
hedging counterparty credit exposure and financing the derivative. The total economic 
cost of hedging and funding is the market rate of the depositor’s debt. This is the basic 
economics of a bilateral derivative trade. 
   
2.2 Replicating an uncollateralized option 
                                                 
3 It is possible that leverage ratio calculation would include the asset under Basel 3.  
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 Following Lou (2013), the wealth equation of a long option economy from party 
B’s perspective is 
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where S denotes the stock price, V option fair price, and 1-Γ the joint survival indicator. 
Lt is a voluntary deposit account set up under Proposition 1, ,

 ttt LLL  

tL  the cash 
amount deposited or posted by party C to B that pays C’s cash rate rc(t), and 

tL  is the 
cash collateral by B to C earning B’s cash rate rb(t).  Ls=(1+h)∆S  is stock lending 
account with haircut h on ∆ shares of stock. The stock short sale proceeds is deposited 
with the stock lender who pays rebate interest at the rate of rs. r- rs is the stock borrowing 
cost.  
Mt  is the cash  (or bank) account that earns the risk free deposit rate r. Nt  is B’s 
debt account that issues short term rolled debt at par rate rN(t), rN(t)>=r(t). The account 
could be secured by the remaining asset of the economy and could have recourse to the 
bank. In the worst case, this is the senior unsecured debt account. 
Self financing equation including default settlement is written as 
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where R is the recovery rate, X is a random marker of the defaulting party, X=1 if 
party B defaults. We have applied pre-default market price V(τ_) as the close-out amount. 
Enforcing full collateralization under Proposition 2, ,,,
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where bb RR 1 , the loss given default for the debt account Nt.  
Setting πt=0 leads to Nt=hΔtSt , showing that the economy only needs to finance 
the residual stock lending margin.  
Assuming zero haircut, then Nt=0, the jump term disappears from the portfolio 
equation. Now apply Ito’s lemma, assume delta hedge under the usual geometric 
Brownian motion stock price (dS=µSdt+σSdW), and set dt term to zero, we obtain the 
following PDE for the fair price of a bilateral option:  
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2.3 Liability side pricing principle  
 
For a pure derivative asset or receivable, V-=0, rb term drops out and the fair price 
V is governed by rc, the cash curve of party C who is on the liability or payable side. A 
derivative asset’s fair value therefore does not depend on an investor’s cost of fund. This 
supports Hull and White (2012)’s argument for adherence to the law of one price.  
For a pure derivative liability or payable, however, party C’s funding curve drops 
out, and V is governed by its own curve rb. This is nothing unusual, as a liability is priced 
off its issuer, rather than its buyer. 
Whether party B is holding a receivable or payable, the bilateral option is always 
priced on its liability side, same as a note being priced by the note issuer’s credit and 
liquidity.  
We now have counterparty’s funding rates accompanying the positive and 
negative parts of the derivative fair value, replacing the usual rV term in the BSM 
equation. An intuitive explanation is that with non-defaultable counterparties, derivative 
fair value accrues at the risk free rate; with defaultable counterparties, however, the 
positive part (receivable) will accrue at the counterparty’s cash rate while the negative 
part at own cash rate.  This can be stated as follows. 
  
Proposition 3 (Principle of Liability Side Pricing): A primary risk factor stripped 
bilateral derivative prices the derivative exposure at the market rate of the liability 
side’s debt. 
 
The bilateral option PDE can be derived in a simpler way with a direct application 
of the liability side pricing principle. Following Hull and White’s textbook approach, we 
write hedge portfolio and finance equations  
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The right hand side of the portfolio differential equation consists of stock 
financing cost at the repo rate, and derivative financing at rates dictated by the liability 
side pricing principle. Applying Ito’s lemma and delta hedge, setting dt term to zero 
results in the same PDE.  
 
The requirement that the primary risks be stripped makes the derivative a plain 
debt, albeit with variable principal exposure. A structured note linked to equity, 
commodity, or foreign exchange rates can be seen as a hybrid debt that should price at 
the issuer’s credit rate once the underlying risk is hedged. 
In the classic BSM theory, a delta hedged option performs like a risk free 
portfolio. With defaultable counterparties, the same portfolio becomes a credit risky debt 
of the party on the liability side. This principle, therefore to some extent, is an extension 
of the risk neutral pricing theory to uncollateralized derivatives. In fact, applying 
Feynman-Kac theorem straightforwardly leads to the same discounted payoff expectation 
formulae, except that the risk free discount rate is replaced by the debt rate that sticks to 
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the liability side. The equivalent martingale measure for the underlying stock price 
remains the same. 
 
Proposition 4 (Extended Risk-neutral Pricing Formula): A bilateral derivative’s no-
arbitrage price is the expected risky discount of the derivative payoff under the 
risk neutral measure Q, with filtration sufficiently enlarged to include the 
counterparty’s credit and funding rates, 
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where V(T) is a T-filtration measureable random variable. In general risky 
discount factor 
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eduretD 0)(  depends on the local fair value so the expectation is coupled 
or recursive.  
 
2.4 Bilateral option PDE with non-zero haircut 
   
Haircut, as an overcollateralization measure to reduce stock lender’s risk to 
volatility, has not been taken up adequately in the FVA literature. Basel 3 stipulates that 
the standard supervisory haircut for a non-main-index equity is 25%. Under the liability 
side pricing setup, the residual stock market value, i.e., the haircut amount, needs to be 
financed by the bank’s treasury. Theoretically, the debt account Nt could have a 
subordinated claim on additional stock market value when financing is closed4. In an 
early paper, Lou (2013) described this feature as endogenous recovery. The applicable 
LGD on Nt is therefore zero. Accordingly the jump term in the differential portfolio 
wealth equation disappears. So again there will be no default settlement cash flow. As Nt 
has no credit loss risk, the applicable rate spread rN – r should not contain compensation 
for party B’s own default risk. It could be zero or up to the funding or liquidity cost or 
basis.     
Below is a PDE with haircut and a collateral account that pays rL on posted 
amount, where L is the amount of collateral posted by C under a weak CSA, 
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The last term reflects cost of funding the collateral under CSA. Obviously, with 
full collateralization, the derivative funding cost in the PDE returns to the risk-free rate, 
confirming discounting with the OIS curve. 
 
2.5 Comparison of PDE with earlier results 
  
                                                 
4 Or the additional cash posted to the stock lender, when short a stock. 
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 There have been a number of efforts in extending the Black-Scholes-Merton PDE 
to study the funding cost impact on derivatives pricing. Lou (2010) recognizes funding 
asymmetry in that deposit and borrowing of cash never earn the same rate. Piterbarg 
(2010) builds an extra collateral return into the BSM equation. Burgard and Kjaer (2011, 
2013) consider funding costs in a bilateral counterparty credit risk setting. Lou (2013) 
discusses realistic stock financing cost while also covering bilateral default risk, finding 
that own default risk could be mitigated if the derivative is segregated, which entails an 
endogenous par recovery.    
These and other similar researches build an asset buyer’s funding cost into 
valuation of a derivative asset and arguably belong to private valuation, rather than fair 
value (Hull and White 2014.)  As we should see, private values are just as important as 
fair value, for they determine the trading desk’s bid and ask prices.  
The extended bilateral option PDE with zero haircut stock financing can be 
generalized in the form below. 
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The last four terms are adjustments, including benefit on own default and funding, 
cost on counterparty’s default and funding, extra cost paid to get cash collateral, and a 
charge from the treasury as N is the funding amount from the bank’s treasury. 
Hull and White (2014) have the simplest case, with h=0, L=0, N=0, and fc=rd – r, 
where rd is a derivative financing rate, and fb=0.  rd is more of a placeholder and does not 
associate with any counterparty. Piterbarg (2011) only considers collateral spread, a 
special case by setting fN=fb=fc=0.  
Burgard and Kjaer (2011) initially uses CDS to hedge both parties’ credit 
exposure, so fb and fc are CDS implied credit spread, specifically, fb=λbRb , fc=λcRc where 
λb and λc are the usual default intensities. The default intensity notion is subsequently 
dropped and replaced with bond yield as using a zero-coupon-zero-recovery bond as a 
counterparty risk hedge instrument is favored over the controversial CDS. Burgard and 
Kjaer (2013) employ different strategies to deal with the hedging error, Nt term in our 
notation. Each strategy would result in variations of the coefficients in the PDE.  
In our case, N=0, fb=rb – r and fc=rc – r. Crepey (2013) and Brigo et al (2014) 
have also shown similar PDEs.  
Variations in PDEs are owing to different funding and hedging arrangements, 
whether derived from a replication argument or from a risk neutral approach. Our 
derivation makes no reference to risk neutral pricing theory, unlike Lou (2013) and Brigo 
et al (2014). The connection to the risk neutral world, however, is not lost. What the 
liability side pricing principle says is that, after the primary risk factors are hedged, a 
bilateral derivative becomes a watered-down debt instrument, similar to a variable 
notional funding note, which shall be priced at the issuer’s current market levels. This 
approach is a natural extension of the risk neutral pricing principle for the purpose of 
pricing bilateral defaultable derivatives. 
The advantage of a risk-neutral based derivation is that it avoids the controversial 
issues of hedging own default risk, by selling own CDS protection or dealing in own 
debts, the former illegal and the latter imprudent and impractical. A close examination of 
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the micro financing structure of a standalone option economy reveals that it is never 
possible for the economy to buy back its debt (Lou 2013). In fact in such a segregated 
derivative economy, there is no own default benefit to hedge. Here we essentially let the 
exposed side (weather the bank or its customer) hedge its exposure by means of shorting 
the other party’s bond with the other party as the security lender, a more familiar but 
equivalent strategy comparing to the par deposit which has nil impact to the balance 
sheet. 
Solely for the purpose of fair value measurement, there is no need to consider 
hedging one’s own default risk. IFRS 13 stipulates an exit price of a would-be liability 
transfer to a third party of the same credit quality. To assume the hedged derivative 
liability, the 3rd party would charge its senior unsecured rate so that the PDE derived will 
again show the inclusion of the liability side’s funding curve as presented above. 
With regards to hedging of counterparty default risk, the use of bond as a hedge 
instrument and a continuously rolled par CDS will result in slightly different rate applied 
to the exposure to counterparty (V+): the former leads to the cash bond rate for example 
Lou (2013), and the latter the synthetic funding rate. Economically, hedging with bonds 
is fully funded, but buying CDS protection is unfunded and relies on the performance of 
the protection seller at the time of the obligator default.  Recognizing this important 
difference is the key to develop a coherent view of CVA and FVA that CVA is the 
unfunded adjustment while the sum of CVA and FVA becomes the funded, full 
adjustment. 
 
3. Fair Value Adjustments 
 
As valuation adjustments are components of the accounting fair value 
measurement, it’s helpful to review the fair value accounting treatment of a simple note 
receivable (or payable).  
 
3.1 Valuation adjustments example – simple note receivable 
 
Party C holds a note receivable issued by party B. If the price of the note, denoted 
by V, is directly observable from the market place, she simply records V on the asset side 
of her balance sheet. Or she could book an asset at the risk-free price V*, then subtracting 
a credit valuation adjustment (CVA) with a contra account.  
CVA is defined to reflect the default risk of the issuer of the note, typically 
measured in terms of the CDS curve. The implied bond price from a traded CDS curve, 
however, seldom agrees with the cash bond price. The difference that needs to be booked 
as yet another fair value adjustment reflects other funding factors such as bond and CDS 
market liquidity disparity, tax, and accounting (Longstaff et al 2005), and this becomes 
the base of a funding valuation adjustment (FVA). For the issuer, the credit component 
and the liquidity or basis component add up to his total financing cost.  
Take for example, for a T maturity, zero coupon, zero recovery bond, let’s denote 
V, V*, V~ the market (cash) price, risk-free price, and the CDS implied (risky) price. 
Assuming flat and deterministic continuously compounding yield y, rate r, and default 
intensity λ, we have the following, 
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 For party C, a buyer of B’s bond, CVA = V*- V~, and CFA= V~ - V, so that V*- 
CVA - CFA = V.  
Symmetrically for party B, the issuer, DVA = V*- V~, and the debit funding 
adjustment (DFA) is defined as DFA = V~- V, so that -V*+ DVA + DFA = -V.  
It is important to see from this simple and agreeable example that CVA and FVA 
are articles introduced to accommodate our way of analysis of the counterparty risk and 
funding factors, credit for default risk and everything else under the funding basis. 
These prices (V, V*, V~) are solutions to the simple ordinary differential equation: 
0 Vr
dt
dV
F , when the funding curve Fr  is specified as the risk-free curve r, the 
synthetic funding curve r~, and the cash curve y, respectively. 
Assuming a deterministic yield and taking out of the stock price, the bilateral 
option PDE in section 2.2 reduces to 0 Vr
dt
dV
F , where the funding curve Fr  is 
specified as br  for B’s debt or cr  for C’s debt, respectively. Zero coupon bond pricing is 
reproduced.  
The simple receivable/payable note is of course not a usual derivative instrument, 
but a bond-like structured note can be created easily. The point is that a bilateral 
derivative pricing model should be able to price the cash bond as a special case, i.e., a 
benchmark test case (Morini and Prampolini 2011). 
 
3.2 Multi-curve setting 
 
To facilitate valuation adjustment definition, let’s introduce two sets of funding 
curves and their resultant prices, in addition to the usual risk free curve r(t) and risk free 
price V*. 
 
Synthetic Funding Curve: A firm’s synthetic (funding) curve is a CDS implied funding 
curve, with its short rate denoted by r~. It has a non-negative spread curve over the risk 
free curve, i.e., r~-r≥0. Under zero-recovery assumption, this corresponds to r+λ, where λ 
is the default intensity in the reduced form modeling approach. 
The risky price V~ of a bilateral defaultable derivative is a price solved from the 
PDE when each counterparty’s funding curve is assumed to be at its synthetic curve. This 
allows separation of the credit risk component of the financing cost so that it can be risk 
managed in the CDS market. 
 
Cash Funding Curve: A firm’s cash (funding) curve is the financing curve observed in 
the debt capital market or secondary bond market, typically for senior unsecured ranked 
debts. Let rb, rc denote the cash (short) rates of party B and party C. 
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The fair price V of a derivative is when both credit and liquidity and other basis 
risks are considered. This is the price that goes into the firm’s books and records. 
 
These prices are all solutions to the same bilateral option PDE when appropriate 
curves are placed. For example, to solve for the risky price V~, one simply replaces the 
cash rates rb and rc with the synthetic rates.  
Other curves, such as the repo curve and collateral curve, may or may not enter 
the fair value PDE depending on whether they are market observable.  
 
3.3 Total counterparty risk adjustment (CRA) 
 
As the fair value V solved from the extended PDE fully incorporates counterparty 
credit risk and derivative funding cost, the total counterparty risk adjustment (CRA) is 
trivially the difference of V and the (counterparty) risk-free value V*. Let U = CRA= V* - 
V. Subtracting the BSM equation for V* from the extended PDE leads to, 
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Noting UT=0, application of Feynman-Kac theorem immediately leads to the 
CRA formula precisely, 
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Intuitively, the total adjustment made to the risk-free price is the sum of liability 
side discounted excess return (re-r) on a notional amount of V
*.  
 
3.4 Coherent CVA and FVA decomposition 
Adjustment due to counterparty credit risk (CVA) was well understood in early 
1990’s (Tang and Li). CVA definitions depend on CDS, which unfortunately has become 
much less liquid following the financial crisis and increasingly unlikely to be available 
for non-advanced markets. CRA therefore offers an advantage as it naturally links to the 
bond spread, not the CDS spread. In advanced economies where there are liquid CDS 
markets, CRA can be further decomposed into a credit risk component – CVA – and a 
funding risk component – FVA, in parallel to the spread decomposition. 
 
3.4.1 CVA and CFA. Consider from party B’s perspective, for a pure receivable, V≥0, rb 
term drops out from the PDE, so own funding curve has no impact. CVA is defined as the 
difference of the risk free price and the synthetic price due to the counterparty’s CDS 
implied funding, 
~* V -V CVA  . 
Credit funding adjustment (CFA) is defined as the difference of the synthetic 
price and the cash price of the derivative, CFA=V~-V. Total valuation adjustment V*- 
V=CVA + CFA.  
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Here CVA is positive, and CFA is assumed positive and therefore understood as a 
cost5, 
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
T
t
dur
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s
t c  
 
This formula bears an intuitive explanation: the total adjustment made to the risk 
free price is the sum of liability side discounted excess return (rc-r) on a notional amount 
same as the risk free price V*. One can easily verify in the benchmark case of a simple 
note receivable. 
To obtain CVA alone, one could replace the cash rate above with the synthetic 
rate. Note this formula is same as typically presented, for instance, in Tang and Li (2007) 
and Gregory (2010) for a zero recovery counterparty. For a portfolio, the risk-free value 
V* would be replaced by the expected positive exposure (EPE) to arrive at the 
counterparty’s CVA, so a typical CVA implementation can be modified trivially to work 
for CFA or they can be computed simultaneously. 
 
3.4.2 DVA and DFA.  Similarly, for a pure payable to party B, V≤0, rc term drops out 
from the PDE so counterparty’s funding curve has no impact and there is no CVA and 
CFA. Debit valuation adjustment (DVA) is defined as the difference between the price 
due to own synthetic funding curve and the risk free price, ~**~ VVV-V DVA  . 
Debit funding adjustment (DFA) is defined as the difference of the cash price and 
the synthetic price of the derivative, i.e., V- VV-V DFA ~~   and, 
 DFA.DVA  V  V *  Here both DVA and DFA are benefit and can be computed 
similarly to CVA/CFA. 
 
3.4.3 Symmetry of CVA/DVA and CFA/DFA.  By flipping the PDE with a negative 
sign, one easily sees a party’s CVA (CFA) is the other party’s DVA (DFA).  
 
3.4.4 In general, if a derivative, for instance, an option trading strategy or an ATM swap, 
is a switcher, neither pure payable nor pure receivable during its life cycle, and if the two 
parties’ financing curves are different, the derivative has to be priced by splitting into an 
asset part and a liability part. Specifically, the PDE asserts that the asset part is 
discounted by the counterparty’s rate and the liability part by the pricing party’s own rate, 
i.e., the liability side rules. We can always write V = V*- CVA + DVA – CFA + DFA.   
To strictly attribute CVA to counterparty default risk, leaving DVA to own 
default risk, we apply party C’s synthetic curve while keeping own curve at the risk free 
curve to get a new price. The difference from the risk free price becomes the CVA. DVA, 
CFA and DFA can all be obtained with such an incremental curve shift scheme. 
                                                 
5 The basis between CDS and cash bond is not guaranteed to be negative or positive as the bond spread is 
usually measured against LIBOR as an industry practice. Post-crisis, the CDS/Bond basis for major 
financial intermediaries has been significant, in the range of 30 to 50 bps. In this article, the funding basis is 
measured against the risk free rate, or OIS. Consequently, it is positive, if we accept that nothing can be 
more liquid than cash itself. 
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Purely for notational convenience, if we denote P(fb, fc) a solution to the PDE, a 
pricing function of the risk-free curve, fb B’s funding curve choice, fc C’s funding curve 
choice, then V*=P(r,r), V~=P(r~b,r
~
c), and V=P(rb,rc). Bilateral bCVA = V* - V
~, and 
bFVA = V~ - V. 
A presentation of costs -- CVA and CFA, and benefits -- DVA and DFA, can be 
done to make whole the incremental adjustments, for example, 
 
DFA. CFA -DVA CVA  - VV
),r ,P(r  )r ,P(r- DFA
),r ,P(r - )r ,P(r CFA
 ),r ,P(r  )r r, P(- DVA
 ),r P(r, - r) P(r, CVA
*
cbcb
~
cb
~
c
~
b
~
c
~
b
~
c
~
c
~





 
 
FVA therefore is a natural companion of CVA, in both concept and formulation. 
CVA has become quite a phenomenon, having dedicated methodologies, systems, 
business units and risk organizations, and regulatory capital charge. It would be 
formidable if FVA, a part of the adjustment to reflect derivative funding cost, will be 
undertaking the same path. Fortunately the PDE presented above allows a coherent 
definition of FVA along with CVA. One could reserve the term FVA for the total 
valuation adjustment, and split it into CVA and CFA. Or one can retain the CVA 
acronym to represent the total adjustment by changing its literals from credit valuation 
adjustment to counterparty valuation adjustment. With minimal work, existing CVA 
framework can easily accommodate FVA and capture CRA.  
 
3.5 Valuation adjustments with risk-free close-out 
 
To close this section, we list below the PDE when the default settlement rule 
follows the 1992 ISDA where the risk free price is regularly used. 
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where λb, λc are default intensities of party B and C respectively. For simplicity, 
the haircut has been set to zero above.    
If we denote U= V* - V as the total valuation adjustment, the PDE becomes, 
 
,0)()*)(()*)(()(
2
1
)(
2
2
22 







  LrrLVrrLVrrUr
S
U
S
S
U
Sqr
t
U
Lcbcbs 
 
 
Apply Feynman-Kac theorem to get the solution, 
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where Q is the joint survival probability, β is the risk free discount factor. The first term 
can split into DVA and DFA, second term CVA and CFA, and the third and last term is 
for collateral cost. 
For ISDA 1992 parties who have yet to adopt the 2009 ISDA Close-out protocol, 
the above formulae can be used. A critical difference resulted from the risk-free price 
settlement is that the total valuation adjustment now has combined the default intensities 
and will involve incorrectly the joint survival probability, even for a pure asset, a concern 
examined by Brigo and Morini (2011).  
 
3.5 Zero recovery CVA and FVA 
 
 Under zero recovery rate assumption, r~c - r = λc, and rc - r = λc + ηc, where λc is 
the default intensity and ηc is the funding basis of party C, the coherent CVA and FVA 
are the following,  
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Obviously CVA is same as usual definition of unilateral CVA which only 
considers counterparty default risk, i.e., no joint survival probability. Corresponding 
results under the risk-free settlement are given below, 
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Note here both CVA and FVA involve B’s intensity in addition to C’s, i.e., which 
is economically counter-intuitive given the concerned derivative is held as a pure asset 
and is a liability of party C. 
 
4. FVA Moving Forward – Discussions and Results 
 
Unlike CVA which has well understood economics and originally unambiguous 
definition6, FVA has been presented in many different ways and its economics vigorously 
debated among researchers from academia and the financial industry. In this section, we 
                                                 
6 Traditional CVA definition is a result of the risk-free replacement value approach which, although 
allowing nice separation of the credit exposure from credit risk factors, has contributed to confusion and 
awkward economics (Brigo et al 2014). Since the adoption of ISDA 2002 Master Agreement and 2009 
Close-out Amount Protocol has become the mainstream, such a definition needs to be revisited. 
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attempt to address a number of topics in the context of an uncollateralized option trading 
strategy between two defaultable counterparties. 
 
4.1 FVA as component of accounting fair value measure 
 
 Financing is a general financial term and funding cost is everywhere, in every 
financial product and every life cycle of a trade. The very first question is whether all 
funding costs shall affect or enter into fair value. FVA literally denotes a funding related 
valuation adjustment made to fair value accounting of a derivative. For any other funding 
costs that do not impact fair value, the firm or its treasury could calculate and exert a 
charge to the desk. We coin the term treasury funding charge (TFC) to distinguish these 
costs from FVA.    
 Simply put, FVA affects a bank’s balance sheet (B/S) and income statement. TFC 
as a charge to the desk but a credit to the treasury, does not appear in the firm’s 
consolidated B/S. A desk may maintain private bid and offer values for its derivatives 
which could have incorporated TFC, but it is fair value that appears in the firm’s books 
and records. 
 With funding costs being divided between FVA and the funding charge, the next 
question becomes what goes where. By virtue of IFRS 13, a funding source and its cost 
typically observable in the market place shall enter into fair value. Repo financing of 
major stocks, for example, reflects the actual and marketable stock financing cost of 
dynamic hedging, so the impact to option fair value is indeed “market based 
measurement.” On the other hand, private arranged stock financing (e.g., in the form of a 
secured loan) shall not count as a market observable funding source and its impact shall 
be evaluated by means of TFC and enter into bid/ask prices in due course. 
What has been proven difficult to categorize is the funding cost of 
uncollateralized bilateral derivatives. The industry, supported by the latest IFRS updates 
(EY 2014), seems to have gained convergence on the need of taking funding cost into fair 
value, but whose funding cost is still wide open. Some argue and use dealers’ own 
funding costs while other favor an industry average, including or excluding the pricing 
dealer itself. Hull and White reject FVA (2012, 2014) in that incorporating a bank’s own 
funding cost in derivatives pricing would violate the law of one price, create arbitrage 
opportunities, and be at fault with investment theories. 
The coherent CVA and FVA settles this question at the liability side’s debt 
financing cost, which is market observable. In essence, without knowing which agent will 
be stepping in in an exit exercise assuming existence of a novation market, the only 
reasonable assumption to make is that agents of different funding costs will compete for 
the novation trade and at equilibrium they will settle at the level of the derivative liability 
party’s cost.       
The third question is whether FVA would violate the law of one price. While this 
is an issue with most, if not all, existing FVA definitions, it does not have to be the case. 
Such a law is derived for and only applies to investment in an asset. It is easy to see that 
assumption of a liability would demand different prices per the firm which takes up the 
liability. Our PDE would result in a unique price dependent on the liability side’s funding 
curve, if the derivative is a pure receivable or asset to the pricing party. If the derivative 
is a pure payable (liability), then it depends on the liability issuing party’s funding curve, 
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in the same way a corporate bond’s price would depend on its issuer’s credit. Of course, 
when the derivative is a switcher of asset and liability, the price could depend on both 
party’s funding curves. For IFRS fair value measurement purposes, the third party 
assuming the liability should be of the same credit quality of the current liability bearer, 
so our definition of FVA is IFRS compliant and there is no violation of law of one price. 
A related issue is the overlapped accounting of FVA and DVA. For a derivative 
receivable, computing FVA on its mark-to-market corresponds to funding at the senior 
unsecured rate. The same funding, if raised from the market, would incur a DVA or 
DVA2 (Hull and White 2012) that would offset the component of FVA that is due to the 
dealer’s own credit risk. The offset is complete only if there is no funding basis. Our 
definition of FVA solely attributes to funding or liquidity basis, on top of, rather than 
inclusive of, the default risk component. Also for the receivable, it is the other party’s 
(rather than own) basis at work. By design, there is no overlap or double counting of 
FVA and DVA. 
For a derivative payable or liability, DVA is now a standard accounting item, 
which Hull and White (2012) refer to as DVA1. An FVA benefit (or FBA), calculated on 
its MTM and at own funding rate, would overlap with DVA1. In the coherent CVA and 
FVA definition, the FVA benefit or DFA is attributed to the funding basis only and DVA 
to default risk, so again by design this is not an issue types. Coherent CVA and FVA as 
an accounting fair value measure therefore does not exhibit double counting issue.  
 
4.2 Treasury funding charge (TFC) 
 
       Uncollateralized derivatives do not have their own financing markets and will 
have to rely on a bank’s treasury function for funding. Funding operation linked to 
derivatives, however, is unconventional. The funding amount fluctuates often 
unpredictably, resulting in unmanageable revolving draw and pay-down. Funding 
duration changes and nominal maturity is subject to a number of early termination events. 
Some derivatives are effectively funding facilities in their own right, with complex 
structural features that would faint a traditional treasury. It is highly desirable for the 
treasury to have an advanced toolset to manage derivatives funding and liquidity risk. 
In sections above, we show some contributing sources to FVA, such as 
counterparty exposure hedges in a bilateral derivative trade and repo funding of 
continuous stock trading in an option’s dynamic replication process. Below we give 
examples where the effect of funding cost is best to be handled as an internal funding 
charge exerted by a bank’s treasury on each trading desk. 
 
Example 4.2.1. A treasury finances a desk’s repo line with a counterparty. The desk 
borrows from treasury with a fixed term (e.g. 2 years) and principal amount (e.g. 100 mm) 
at LIBOR + 40 basis points, while it lends out at LIBOR + 100 bps. The bank may 
account the repo on an accrual basis. Then there is no fair value involved, nor is there an 
FVA. The trade does involve a funding cost (+ 40 bps) which is internal between the desk 
and the treasury, i.e., charge to the desk is gain to the treasury and from the bank’s 
perspective, there is no net impact to its book and records.  
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Example 4.2.2.  Same as above, but the desk is able to source the term fund from an 
external bank at LIBOR + 30 bps and has to book it as a separate trade. There is no 
internal funding charge here as no bank fund is used. The desk may book back-to-back 
repos and realize a funding arbitrage P&L on a present value basis, probably with 
marginal FVA to take into consideration of counterparty credit risk hedges. 
 
Example 4.2.3. Similar to example 4.2.1., but the trade is done in a TRS format, fair 
valued and mark-to-market daily. As a result, the funding amount will float in accordance 
with the market value of the asset funded. A treasury could treat this as a flat funding 
principal and offer to fund the variation at its overnight rate. If the treasury desires to 
capture the variable funding principal and its reinvestment risk, it will need a funding 
charge measure, a tool to calculate it, and implementation policies and procedures well 
vetted. 
 
Example 4.2.4. Let’s take a look at the PDE with non-zero haircut in section 3.4. Haircut 
h and the repo rate are both market observable but there is presently no funding market 
for the residual funding amount Nt=hΔtSt. With h=25%, this amount is sizable. Per 
discussion above, this funding cost can not enter FVA and shall be handled as a funding 
charge. The treasury has to come up with the rate charged rN. The funding charge can be 
computed, for instance, 
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where again Q is the joint survival probability, β is the risk free discount factor.  
 
Burgard and Kjaer (2013) employ multiple funding strategies to have open 
windfall or shortfall upon a dealer’s own default. FVA is defined as sum of DVA and 
FCA (funding cost adjustment) which links to hedging error of the derivative trader’s 
hedging strategy. The derivative asset price would not only depend on the dealer’s 
funding cost, but also dealer’s trading desks’ strategies. This setup is more in sync as a 
funding charge measure, rather than a fair value adjustment. 
Similarly, Brigo et al, Crepey, and other others have indeed contributed to models 
to measure the TFC. In fact, all private valuation can be thought of fair value with TFC 
deducted. 
 
4.3 Funding cost contributes to bid-ask spreads 
 
FVA and TFC are complimentary in that FVA is a part of the fair value while 
TFC contributes to the bid/ask spread off the fair value. Lou (2014) demonstrates that 
asymmetric funding cost and stock financing cost could contribute significantly to option 
market making. For exchange traded longer term options, the contribution alone is at the 
magnitude of the observed bid-ask spreads.  
For non-central cleared bilateral OTC derivatives, market depth needs to be 
carefully examined. In particular, an uncollateralized bilateral trade with non-vanilla 
features is best treated as an illiquid trade. It could take days to value and negotiation to 
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agree on an unwinding price. Costs from all sources will be considered, funding cost, 
carrying cost, capital usage, hedging cost or hedge unwinding cost, legal and other fees, 
etc. A desk has to be prepared to determine its bid and ask, i.e., a private value range.  
On a high level, the bid and ask can be caused by asymmetric treasury operation, 
i.e., borrowing cash from treasury incurs higher rates than depositing cash with treasury. 
Lou’s setup (2010, 2014) is a typical yet extreme case where deposit is at the risk free 
rate while borrowing at the firm’s senior unsecured rate. To long a derivative asset, the 
desk has the treasury finance the purchase, i.e., borrows cash from the treasury, and to 
short, she gets paid cash which earns deposit rate. Intuitively she would pay (bid) for less 
to compensate the cost of financing the purchase and ask for more to compensate the 
mean return on cash.  
As each firm’s funding cost is different and treasury operates in its own way, it 
would be natural to expect derivative desks to maintain their own sets of bid and ask 
prices. When a customer order arises, the best bid or ask gets hit and that hit becomes a 
print of the trade and the market price. If customer’s order is large, a syndicate could be 
formed and the final offer is cut with knowledge of market depth. Syndication is in fact 
how primary debt issuances are getting done and a firm’s cash financing rate is 
determined. The liability side pricing principle implicitly assumes a market mechanism 
for the derivative liability that resembles the cash debt syndication process and stipulates 
that the bid or ask priced comparable to the liability side’s debt rate is the fair market 
level.  
  
4.4 Multi-curve and discounting 
    
 Discounting fully collateralized derivatives at OIS rather than usual LIBOR 
constitutes the first significant advancement of post-crisis finance. Multi-curve setting 
separating discounting curve from interest rate indices immediately becomes the new 
market standard in swaps and interest rate derivatives markets. For uncollateralized 
trades, FVA is supposed to be the thing, but never quite gets there due to its many 
definitions and lack of consensus thereof. For example, it is never clear from the FVA 
literature as how discounting should be done in an uncollateralized bilateral derivative 
trade.  Most resort to the usual risk-free discounting while qualifying payoffs or 
exposures with different default behaviors, so that there is no clean identification of a 
discounting curve like the OIS vs LIBOR discounting. The liability-side pricing principle 
is the first to have a clear answer: uncollateralized payoffs and cashflows are to be 
discounted locally at the liability-side’s financing curve.  
With the issue of discounting uncollateralized derivatives settled, models 
integrating counterparty credit risk and market risk can be developed for various 
derivatives products. Counterparty risk sensitive fair value can now come out from a 
single model, instead of a market model for the counterparty risk free price plus separate 
adjustment calculations. Noticeably, in the first consultative document of BASEL 
Committee on Banking Supervision on the fundamental review of the trading book (May 
2012), there was an agenda of integrating counterparty credit risk with market risk so that 
there would be no need for a separate CVA risk capital charge. In the second consultative 
document, however, the committee deemed, for the time being, such an integrated model 
not readily available and feared its complexity and model risk, and subsequently decided 
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to keep the controversial CVA risk capital charge as a standalone capital charge. The 
liability-side pricing principle however does offer a simple and intuitive framework to 
fully integrate counterparty credit risk and market risk and it could potentially reopen the 
dialogue. 
 A funding curve is a discounting curve. A popular CVA calculation method is to 
discount projected and aggregated future cash flow with the cash curve and the risk-free 
curve separately, the resulting npv difference then being taken as CVA. There are couple 
variations possible as when to choose which party’s curve (EY 2014). For example one 
might apply counterparty’s credit curve to discount if the future net cash flow is incoming 
or positive, or own curve if outgoing or negative. These types of discounting schemes can 
best be presented as approximate. As pointed out earlier, the extended PDE exhibits a 
switching, localized discounting rate dependent on the fair value instead of the net cash 
flow.  
In the liability-side discounting scheme leading to fair value and related valuation 
adjustments, there is no role for Libor. The funding basis is measured based on the risk 
free rate or OIS curve, although industry convention typically compares a zero-volatility 
spread to Libor with the CDS spread of the same tenor. At the time when OIS was 
proposed to be the discount curve for collateralized trades, most thought Libor could 
remain its role for uncollateralized trades. This can be partially justified, if we assume the 
funding basis of the counterparties are same as the basis of Libor to OIS. Specifically, for 
a derivative book of uncollateralized trades that already have CVA/DVA calculated and 
use Libor as the discount curve, there is no need to calculate FVA, on a first order 
approximation basis. 
  
4.5 Sample numerical results 
 
 Under a simple case where the dealer buys an option from party C, assuming all 
rates are flat, CVA from B&K denoted as CVA_BK is, 
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To highlight the difference of B&K from the coherent CVA, assuming zero basis, 
our CVA is given by 
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 Obviously CVA_BK depends on the hazard rate of the dealer, λB but CVA_LSP 
does not. The ratios of CVA to the risk-free option price are plotted in Figure 1 with T-
t=5 years, and both recovery rates at 40%. 
Because the governing PDE or the risk-neutral pricing formula has an effective 
discount rate switching on the fair value itself, the fair value solution is in general 
recursive and would require numerical schemes to address the switching discount rate. A 
finite difference scheme where an iterative procedure is used to determine the 
asset/liability boundary (Lou 2015) is adopted to solve the extended BSM PDE under the 
liability pricing principle. 
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To demonstrate, we price a shifted stock forward, i.e., an option trade that longs a 
45 strike European call and short a 55 strike put of same one year expiry, with the spot 
price at 50. This trade has positive payoff when stock price ST is above 50 and negative 
otherwise, so it involves true bilateral valuation adjustments.  
At 50% volatility, 5% risk-free rate and 50 bps repo or stock borrowing cost, the 
risk-free price is 1.6009. Set bank B’s zero recovery CDS at flat 50 bps and liquidity 
basis 20 bps, and C’s CDS at 300 bps, liquidity basis 50 bps, the fair price of the trade is 
1.3577. The total valuation adjustment of 0.2432 is decomposed into CVA=0.2501, 
DVA=0.0342, CFA=0.0410, and lastly DFA=0.0136.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Comparisons of LSP CVA ratio to B&K CVA ratio vs dealer’s hazard rate (λB) 
under two counterparty hazard rates λc =0 and λc =5%. 
Obviously, finite difference schemes are of limited uses for CVA and FVA of a 
large derivative portfolio or netting set. A Monte Carlo simulation procedure would have 
to be developed. 
 
5. Conclusion   
 
Starting from an economic analysis of an uncollateralized option, we find that the 
liability side party can fund and credit hedge the other party by making a deposit that 
earns its debt interest rate. An option remains replicable and the newly derived PDE 
applies counterparty’s curve to net derivative receivable and own curve to net payable. In 
an extension to the risk-neutral pricing formula, the fair value is found to be the 
expectation of liability-side discounted payoffs. Discounting of bilateral defaultable 
derivatives is now clearly identified with the liability side’s curve, enabling future 
development of integrated counterparty credit risk and market risk models.  
The extended PDE serves to define the total counterparty risk adjustment precisely 
by discounting at the local liability curve the product of the risk-free price and the credit 
spread. The adjustment can be broken coherently into CVA -- a default risk component 
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corresponding to CDS, and FVA -- a component due to funding or liquidity basis. 
Specifically, the same PDE is solved under the synthetic or CDS implied funding curve 
to arrive at the risky price, then the differences between the risk-free price and the risky 
price become CVA and DVA, while the differences between the fair price and the risky 
price become CFA (credit funding adjustment) and DFA (debit funding adjustment). 
CFA and DFA are collectively called FVA. These measures are symmetric. 
This new treatment resolves important FVA debate issues: it is in line with the IFRS 
13 standard on fair value measurement; there is no overlap or double counting between 
DVA and FVA; a derivative asset’s fair value will not depend on the holding party’s 
funding cost, i.e., there is no violation of the law of one price; cashflow aggregation and 
discounting schemes are not accurate. For a funding cost not observable or not market 
prevailing, it is better to leave it out of FVA and treat it in an internal or treasury funding 
charge that would impact the desk’s bid and offer prices.  
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